The effect of remuneration committees, directors’ shareholding and institutional ownership on the remuneration of directors in the top 100 companies in South Africa by Scholtz, HE & Engelbrecht, WA
22 
iSouthern African Business Review Special Edition Accounting Research 2015
The effect of remuneration committees, directors’ 
shareholding and institutional ownership on the 
remuneration of directors in the top 100 companies in 
South Africa
H.E. Scholtz & W.A. Engelbrecht
7A B S T R A C T
15Executive directors’ remuneration of leading South African companies 
often attracts the attention of the press, shareholders and unions. 
The research on which this article is based investigated whether 
executive directors’ remuneration of the Top 100 companies listed 
on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) is infl uenced by the 
implementation of certain corrective corporate governance measures. 
The remuneration of executive directors was regressed on a number 
of fi rm and corporate governance characteristics to determine 
whether these characteristics have an infl uence on executive directors’ 
remuneration. It was found that corporate governance reforms relating 
to institutional ownership, the number of non-executive directors on the 
remuneration committee, shareholder voting on the remuneration policy 
and the number of remuneration committee meetings act as an effective 
governance tool to protect shareholders’ interests with regard to some 
of the elements of executive directors’ remuneration.
16Key words:  executive directors’ remuneration, agency theory, corporate governance, 
remuneration committee, directors’ shareholding, institutional ownership
Background
1With the development of the modern corporation as we know it today, management 
and ownership were split. The alignment of the interests of management and 
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ownership remains a controversial issue. The agency theory is one whereby a 
principal (the shareholders in this case) engage an agent (the directors), delegating 
decision-making authority to the directors. Consequently, agency theory focuses on 
the conflict which may arise between shareholders and directors due to the separation 
between ownership and control. Research found the directors’ remuneration package 
to be an effective way of monitoring the directors (Jensen & Meckling 1976: 308).
2Many researchers believe that excessive executive directors’ remuneration was one 
of the factors which contributed to the recent global financial crisis (Crotty 2009: 
564; INTOSAI 2010: 6). Before the financial crisis, the remuneration practices 
of financial institutions rewarded and encouraged excessive risk-taking by giving 
incentives for the volume of loans granted, rather than the long-term asset quality of 
the loans (INTOSAI 2010: 6).
3Executive directors’ remuneration of leading South African companies often 
attracts the attention of the press, shareholders and trade unions (Bonorchis & 
Crowley 2014; Slabbert 2014). Mergence Asset Managers recently conducted a study 
which calculated the average gap between executive remuneration and average wages 
across a sample of developed and developing countries. South Africa was ranked as the 
country with the 5th largest remuneration gap. This study also reported that a CEO 
earns an average of 140 times more than the average salaried employee. The problem 
is that executive remuneration is not always in line with company performance and 
that corrective measures need to be implemented (Preston 2014: 3–4).
4Corporate governance mechanisms were introduced to control and strengthen the 
agency theory and provide shareholders with some assurance that directors will strive 
to achieve outcomes that are in the shareholder’s interests (Shleifer & Vischny 1997).
Corporate governance codes
1The US corporate governance system has evolved over a few decades. Corporate 
ownership in the US became dispersed as early as 1930, resulting in the agency 
theory. Individual share ownership continued to be the dominant form of share-
ownership up until the 1980s. These individuals were rarely actively engaged 
in corporate governance and corporate boards were mainly made up of insiders. 
During the 1980s macro-economic growth slowed down and the US economy 
was under pressure. Institutional ownership came to the fore as shareholders of 
companies with hostile takeovers and pension funds investing in companies. 
These institutional investors began to participate in the affairs of the companies 
they had shares in and became active players in the corporate governance of 
companies. The need for corporate governance codes emerged in 1987 when the 
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Treadway Commission was introduced in the US and recommended, inter alia, 
that all companies should develop and enforce written codes of conduct. In the 
1990s the trend towards greater shareholder influence continued but management 
wanted to protect their companies. Managers aligned themselves increasingly with 
the interests of shareholders through new forms of executive remuneration such 
as equity based remuneration and the creation of shareholder value. The collapse 
of Enron in 2001 caused a re-examination of corporate governance codes around 
the world. The Sarbanes Oxley legislation, whereby many corporate governance 
reforms were legislated, was introduced and this sharpened the differences between 
the US and UK approaches to corporate governance (Jackson 2010).
2The UK experienced a wave of corporate failures in the 1980s, resulting in a lack 
of confidence in the quality of financial reporting and external auditors’ ability to 
provide assurances on the financial conditions of the companies they reported on. 
Consequently, the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 
was established in the UK in 1991, led by Sir Adrian Cadbury (later known as the 
Cadbury Committee). The Cadbury Committee issued recommendations of good 
corporate governance in a Code of Best Practice. The Cadbury Report would be used 
as a model for the development of corporate governance codes in various countries 
around the world, including South Africa. The UK adopted a voluntary approach to 
corporate governance, in contrast to the regulation-based corporate governance code 
in the US (Cheffins 2012: 17–22).
3Re-entry into the global economy after 1994 created opportunities as well 
as challenges for South African companies. To be able to compete in the global 
economy, South African companies were compelled to implement improved corporate 
governance standards (Vaughn & Ryan 2006). In November 1994, the King code of 
corporate governance (King I) was issued by a committee of the Institute of Directors, 
chaired by Mervyn King. This code of compliance was based on the Cadbury Report, 
with necessary amendments for circumstances prevalent in South Africa. In 2002, a 
revised version of the report was issued, King II. In 2010, the Companies Act no. 71 
of 2008 (Companies Act) and changes in international corporate governance led to a 
new report being issued, King III (IoD 2009: 4).
Theories supporting executive directors’ remuneration
1The theories underlying executive directors’ remuneration are agency theory, 
stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory. Although it is agreed that corporate 
governance originated from agency theory, it has been argued that corporate 
governance has been influenced by system-orientated theories. Stakeholder theory 
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and legitimacy theory are examples of these system-orientated theories, which are 
meant to complement and not replace the agency theory. Stakeholder theory and 
legitimacy theory focus on the role of information and disclosure in the relationship 
between the company and the parties with which it interacts (Deegan 2009). This 
explains the use of appropriate corporate governance disclosures for executive 
remuneration and the adoption of widely accepted remuneration practices, such 
as the establishment of a remuneration committee (Liu & Taylor 2008: 60; Bender 
2003: 207–208).
Problem statement
1Against the background stated above, research was undertaken to determine whether 
executive directors’ remuneration is influenced by certain corporate governance 
recommendations as well as firm characteristics.
Structure of the rest of the article
1The rest of this article is structured as follows: firstly, an overview of corporate 
governance principles applicable to directors’ remuneration as tested, is provided. 
This is followed by the research objective and limitations of the study. Next, a review 
of prior research and the development of hypotheses is presented. A discussion of 
the methodology follows including the sample selection and a presentation of the 
research model. The empirical results are then discussed, followed by the conclusion 
and suggestions for future research.
Corporate governance principles applicable and tested regarding 
directors’ remuneration
Directors’ remuneration
1King III (IoD 2009: 30) requires that a company’s remuneration policies should 
be aligned with its strategy and should create value for the company over the long-
term. This remuneration policy has to be approved by the company’s shareholders 
(IoD 2009: 31). Further, a remuneration report has to be included disclosing all 
benefits paid to each individual director (IoD 2009: 30). Annual bonuses granted 
should relate to performance and must be reviewed regularly to ensure that they are 
appropriate (PWC 2009: 85).
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2Since King III is grounded in the UK Cadbury Report (IoD 2009: 4), further 
guidance on directors’ remuneration can be found in the UK Corporate Governance 
Code. This code stipulates that executive remuneration has to enhance the long-
term success of the company (FRC 2012: 6). Schedule A of this code warns that the 
remuneration committee has to ensure that there is a balance between fixed and 
performance-related, and immediate and deferred remuneration (FRC 2012: 24).
Institutional ownership
1The ‘apply or explain’ approach of King III, in terms of listed companies, is stronger 
if its implementation is overseen by parties with a vested interest in the market, 
particularly the institutional investor. Past experience has shown that failures in 
relation to governance can be attributed, in part, to an absence of active institutional 
investors. Institutional investors should be encouraged to vote and engage with 
companies (IoD 2009: 9).
2The King Committee supports the suggestion of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development that shareholders must be able to consult with each 
other on matters concerning basic shareholder rights. This will help to prevent abuse 
in the form of amalgamations, schemes of arrangement, takeovers, mergers and the 
disposal of the greater part of the assets of a company (IoD 2009: 9).
Non-executive directors on the board and committees
1In terms of recommendations of King II and King III, boards of directors should 
be comprised of a majority of non-executive directors. King III further specifies 
that these directors should be independent of the company to enhance objectivity 
of decisions and views. The chairman of the board should be an independent non-
executive director. The chairman and the chief executive officer should not be the 
same person. A lead independent director should be appointed if the chairman is 
not independent (IoD 2009: 24–25).
2Since the 1980s, the inclusion of independent non-executive directors on corporate 
boards has received increasing attention (Fama & Jensen 1983). Two main arguments 
in support thereof are: firstly, independent non-executive directors provide advice 
to corporate boards on strategic decisions, which may improve the firm’s economic 
and financial performance. Secondly, it leads to better monitoring of management 
decisions and activities by corporate boards (Chen & Jaggi 2000: 1–2).
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Vote on remuneration policy
1The Companies Act and King III give shareholders a greater voice in the remuneration 
policies and practices of a company. Every year, a non-binding advisory vote must be 
taken by the shareholders of the company at the annual general meeting in respect 
of the remuneration policy applicable for the following year (IoD 2009: 52). This 
approach is taken in order to give feedback to the directors on policy items related 
to remuneration, and not directly on pay levels (Ernst & Young 2013: 4). Section 66 
(8) and (9) as well as section 30 (4), (5) and (6) of the Companies Act sets out the 
approval requirements and disclosure respectively, that affect executive directors’ 
remuneration.
2Legislation giving shareholders a voice is found in many countries. Of significance 
is the UK Executive Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations of 2002, which 
incorporated the ‘say on pay’ initiative. This initiative gave shareholders a mandatory 
non-binding vote on executive remuneration in the UK. It was introduced by the UK 
government as a result of outrage at the increasing levels of directors’ remuneration. 
The initiative promotes shareholder involvement, giving shareholders more power 
and influence with regard to director remuneration (Conyon & Sadler 2010: 296).
3In terms of a Discussion Paper issued by the UK Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills in 2012, a proposal was made to replace the current advisory 
shareholder vote on executive remuneration with one which is binding in nature 
(Gajjar 2014: 104). Gajjar (2014) explored governance mechanisms and whether 
the binding shareholder vote is an effective tool to improve remuneration-setting 
processes. Due to the nature of the advisory vote, the board is not legally bound to 
act upon a conflict shown by shareholders when voting on directors’ remuneration. 
Studies in the US and UK found that advisory votes did not show encouraging signs 
of curbing excessive pay (Gajjar 2014: 115).
Remuneration committee
1The core of corporate governance is the relationship between a board of directors, 
the executive management team, the shareholders and other stakeholders. The 
correct management of this relationship is crucial in the field of remuneration 
(IoD 2013: 1). King III encourages the use of board committees (IoD 2009: 46), 
though it is important to understand that this delegation of function does not 
exempt the board of directors from its responsibilities and obligations. It remains 
the responsibility of the board to approve recommendations made by these board 
committees. Examples of board committees include (but are not limited to) audit, 
remuneration, nomination, and social and ethics committees (IoD 2009: 46). 
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Therefore, the remuneration committee plays a pivotal role in managing the quality 
of the remuneration information, disclosures and decisions of a company. The 
remuneration committee assists in building public trust and in making sustainable 
business decisions (IoD 2013: 4). This committee should comprise of a majority of 
non-executive directors (IoD 2009: 29). A function of independent non-executive 
directors is to strengthen the monitoring of the firm’s management through good 
corporate governance (Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome & Weintrop 2007: 63).
2Companies have a responsibility to compensate directors and executives with a fair 
remuneration. The remuneration committee is assigned to assist in the setting and 
administering of these remuneration policies (PWC 2009: 84). The remuneration 
committee should make recommendations to the board on the company’s policy and 
structure for all forms of remuneration paid to the directors and senior management. 
This should be accompanied by the establishment of a formal and transparent 
procedure for developing remuneration policies (PWC 2009: 48–50).
3The Greenbury Report on executive directors’ remuneration makes 
recommendations in terms of the membership and qualifications of the non-executive 
directors on the remuneration committee. Firstly, other than being a shareholder 
of the company, no personal financial interest must be prevalent. Secondly, no 
cross-directorships between members and executive directors may exist that could 
result in their influencing one another’s remuneration. Thirdly, the members of the 
remuneration committee should have a sound knowledge of the company and its 
executive directors, an ardent interest in its progress and a thorough understanding 
of the shareholders’ concerns (Greenbury 1995: 19). Independence, in terms of King 
III, is a non-executive who is not a representative of a shareholder who can control or 
significantly influence management, who does not have a direct or indirect interest in 
the company, who is not employed in an executive capacity or who is the designated 
auditor or legal advisor, is not a professional advisor, is free from any business or 
other relationship which could interfere with the non-executive’s ability to act in an 
independent manner nor receives remuneration contingent upon the performance of 
the company (IoD 2009: 36–37).
Research objective, scope and limitations
1The objective of this study was to examine whether certain firm characteristics 
are an effective way of protecting shareholders’ interests with respect to executive 
directors’ remuneration. To achieve the objective, the remuneration of executive 
directors was regressed on a number of firm and corporate governance characteristics 
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to determine whether these characteristics have an influence on executive directors’ 
remuneration.
2The study had specific limitations. The assessment was limited to the annual 
reports of the Top 100 companies listed on the JSE for the period 2009 to 2012 as 
sourced from the INET McGregor BFA database. Specific market-based and 
accounting-based performance measures were used in the study. The measures were 
selected based on prior research. The usage of other performance measures could 
possibly have led to different results. The independence of independent directors was 
assumed as stated in the annual reports.
Prior research and hypothesis development
1A wide range of research on executive remuneration was used during this study to 
identify factors that influence executive directors’ remuneration.
Hypothesis development
1Numerous prior studies (e.g. Clarkson, Walker & Nicholls 2011; Conyon & 
Sadler 2010) have investigated executive remuneration and found that executive 
remuneration can be influenced by certain firm and corporate governance 
characteristics. Clarkson et al. (2011: 63) investigated the sensitivity of executive 
remuneration in relation to firm performance and found that executive remuneration 
was sensitive to remuneration disclosure and the non-binding shareholders’ 
vote. The factors that were examined in the study reported in this article include 
corporate governance characteristics specifically relating to the firm characteristics 
(institutional shareholding, directors’ shareholding), remuneration committee 
(proportion of non-executive directors on the remuneration committee, vote on 
the remuneration policy), and certain control variables (company size, headline 
earnings per share, debt, profitability and growth). The related studies are identified 
in the sections below.
Ownership structure: Institutional ownership
1A summary of the main findings of studies relevant to institutional ownership is 
presented in Table 1.
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Table 1: Findings of studies relevant to institutional ownership
mdcccxliiAuthors
mdcccxliiiCountry and number 
of companies tested
mdcccxlivFindings




mdcccxlviiUS (1914 companies 
from the Standard & 
Poor’s Execu-comp 
database)
mdcccxlviiiInstitutional ownership positively 
infl uences the pay-for-performance of 
executive director remuneration. Further, 
the study confi rmed that institutions are 
effective in monitoring the agency theory 
between shareholders and managers. 
mdcccxlixSupports hypothesis 1.
mdccclCheng and Firth 
(2005)
mdcccliHong Kong (2016 
companies listed on 
the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange)
mdcccliiThe level of executive director 






mdccclvUS (661 companies from 
the Standard & Poor’s 
Execu-comp database 
and Thomson Financial 
Shareworld database)
mdccclviInstitutional ownership concentration of 
larger institutions does restrict the salaries, 
share options and total compensation of 
executive directors.
mdccclviiSupports hypothesis 1.
mdccclviiiOzkan (2007) mdccclixUK (414 fi rms from the 
FTSE All Share Index)
mdccclxInstitutional shareholders have a signifi cant 
and negative impact on executive 
remuneration, confi rming that institutional 
shareholders are an effective monitoring 
tool to reduce levels of executive 
remuneration.
mdccclxiSupports hypothesis 1.
mdccclxiiDong and Ozkan 
(2008)
mdccclxiiiUK (563 UK fi rms) mdccclxiv‘Dedicated’ or long-term institutional 









mdccclxixLarge institutional owners assisted with 
monitoring of executive remuneration 
and evidence indicated that there were 
reduced levels of total compensation, 
increased pay-for-performance sensitivity 







mdccclxxivFirms that have political connections 
limit the effectiveness of institutional 
shareholder monitoring. 
mdccclxxvThis is not in direct 
support of hypothesis 
1 yet indicates a 




mdccclxxviOzkan (2011) mdccclxxviiUK (390 companies listed 
on the FTSE All Share 
Index)
mdccclxxviiiInstitutional and block holder ownership 
had a signifi cant and negative impact on 
the total director and cash compensation. 
In addition, institutional ownership had 
a positive and signifi cant impact on pay-
performance sensitivity of option grants.
mdccclxxixSupports hypothesis 1.
1Source: Compiled by authors
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1Based on the studies listed in Table 1, there is evidence that institutional shareholders 
are effective observers to monitor the agency theory between shareholders and 
directors of a company by limiting executive directors’ remuneration.
2It is therefore expected that:
1H1:  Remuneration of executive directors will be lower for companies with higher 
levels of institutional ownership.
Ownership structure: Directors’ shareholding
1A summary of the main findings of studies relevant to directors’ shareholding is 
presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Findings of studies relevant to directors’ shareholding
mdccclxxxAuthors mdccclxxxiCountry and number 
of companies tested
mdccclxxxiiFindings mdccclxxxiiiLink with the current 
study
mdccclxxxivKhan et al. 
(2005)
mdccclxxxvUS (661 companies from 
the Standard & Poor’s 
Execu-comp database 
and Thomson Financial 
Shareworld database)
mdccclxxxviDirectors who hold shares become 
risk averse and increase the level of 
salaries as compensation instead of 
share options. Directors’ shareholding 
could compromise the monitoring 





mdccclxxxixHong Kong (2016 
companies listed on 
the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange)
mdcccxcThis research study proved that it is the 
trend in Hong Kong fi rms to reduce 
executive compensation in the case 
of directors’ shareholding due to the 
receipt of large cash dividends.
mdcccxciThis is not in direct support 
of hypothesis 2. Several 
Hong Kong fi rms are 
family-controlled and to 
avoid negative criticism 
about excessive director 














mdcccxcviiiUK (390 UK non-
fi nancial fi rms from the 
FTSE All Share Index)
mdcccxcixShareholding by executive directors 
had a non-linear impact on total 
executive director remuneration whilst 
shareholding by non-executive directors 
had a negative effect on remuneration. 
Non-executive directors’ shareholding is 
an effective monitoring tool.
mcmSupports hypothesis 2.
1Source: Compiled by authors
1Based on the studies by Khan et al. (2005) and Basu et al. (2007), directors’ 
shareholding increased the executive directors’ remuneration.
2It is therefore expected that:
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1H2:  Remuneration of executive directors will be higher for companies with 
higher levels of directors’ shareholding.
Non-executive directors on the remuneration committee
1A summary of the main findings of studies relevant to non-executive directors on 
the remuneration committee is presented in Table 3.
Table 3:  Findings of studies relevant to non-executive directors serving on the remuneration 
committee
mcmiAuthors
mcmiiCountry and number 
of companies tested
mcmiiiFindings




mcmviUS (literature review) mcmviiA literature review was done to 
examine the correlation between board 
composition and company performance. 
In a summary of studies conducted to 
test this correlation, the results were 
insignifi cant and did not report that 
fi rm performance was enhanced by an 
increase in ‘outside’ directors on the 
board.
mcmviiiThis is not in support of 
hypothesis 3 since the 





mcmxUS (160 companies from 
the Standard & Poor’s 
Execu-comp database)
mcmxiAs the proportion of independent, non-
executive directors increases, executive 
remuneration decreases. 
mcmxiiSupports hypothesis 3.
mcmxiiiCheng and Firth 
(2005)
mcmxivHong Kong (2016 
companies listed on 
the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange)
mcmxvNon-executive directors do not limit 
executive director remuneration.
mcmxviThis is not in support of 
hypothesis 3 since the 
results were statistically 
insignifi cant.
mcmxviiBasu et al. (2007) mcmxviiiJapan
mcmxix(174 Japanese 
companies)
mcmxxAs the proportion of independent, non-
executive directors increases, the average 
executive remuneration decreases.
mcmxxiSupports hypothesis 3.
mcmxxiiWong (2009) mcmxxiiiHong Kong
mcmxxiv(484 companies listed 
on the Hong Kong Main 
Board)






mcmxxix(143 companies listed on 
the ASX300)
mcmxxxThis research study found that large 
companies’ non-executive directors 
ensure that executive remuneration 
is aligned with fi rm performance. The 
above results were not consistently found 
in medium and small companies.
mcmxxxiAlthough not in direct 
support of hypothesis 3, 
it does affect one of the 
control variables used in 
this study, namely fi rm 
performance.
1Source: Compiled by authors
1In summary, and based on the results of the research by Basu et al. (2007), Wong 
(2009), and Cybinski and Windsor (2013), as indicated in Table 3, it can be stated 
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that the presence of non-executive directors on the remuneration committee does 
limit executive directors’ remuneration.
2It is therefore expected that:
1H3:  Remuneration of executive directors will be lower for companies where the 
remuneration committee consists of a majority of non-executive members.
Shareholder vote on remuneration policy
1A summary of the main findings of studies relevant to shareholder vote on the 
remuneration policy is presented in Table 4.










mcmxxxviiUK (41 companies 
listed on the FTSE 350 
Index)
mcmxxxviiiShareholders use their votes to 
show disapproval over remuneration 
policies, but there is not a consistent 
response to the voting results.
mcmxxxixAlthough not in direct 
support of hypothesis 
4, it still indicates 
disapproval over 
executive remuneration.
mcmxlAl-Issa (2009) mcmxliUK (266 companies 
listed on the FTSE 350 
Index)
mcmxliiShows evidence that shareholders 
use the advisory vote to limit 
executive remuneration or removal 
of the executive director.
mcmxliiiSupports hypothesis 4.
mcmxlivFels (2010) mcmxlvAustralia (literature 
review)
mcmxlviLiterature review of studies 
where the use of a non-binding 
vote is not enough to mitigate 
excessive executive remuneration. 
Recommends that action should 
be taken based on the number of 
successive negative votes.
mcmxlviiAlthough not in direct 
support of hypothesis 





mcmxlixUK (1 958 UK 
companies)
mcmlShareholders are prepared to show 
dissatisfaction by voting against 
director remuneration, but not to 
the extent of removing directors. 
The regression results indicate 
that executive remuneration is not 
curbed or altered by shareholder 
votes.
mcmliThe current research 
evaluates the hypothesis 
whether executive 
director remuneration 
will be lower where 
shareholders vote on 
the remuneration policy.
mcmliiFerri and Maber 
(2013)
mcmliiiUK (600 companies) mcmlivDoes not show a change in the level 
of executive remuneration since the 
implementation of the advisory vote.
mcmlvAlthough not in direct 
support of hypothesis 
4, it still indicates 
disapproval over 
executive remuneration.
Source: Compiled by authors
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1In summary, the studies listed in Table 4 show that shareholders are prepared 
to show their disapproval of the directors’ remuneration by voting against it, but 
the regression results do not consistently show that directors’ remuneration is 
constrained by it.
2It is therefore expected that:
1H4:  Remuneration of executive directors will be lower for companies where the 
shareholders vote on the remuneration policy at the shareholder meeting.
Frequency of remuneration committee meetings
1A summary of the main findings of studies relevant to frequency of remuneration 
committee meetings is presented in Table 5.
Table 5: Findings of studies relevant to frequency of remuneration committee meetings
mcmlviAuthors mcmlviiCountry and 
number of 
companies tested
mcmlviiiFindings mcmlixLink with the current 
study





mcmlxiiA negative and signifi cant association 
between fi rm performance and the 




mcmlxvUK (150 companies 
listed on the 
London Stock 
Exchange)
mcmlxviA negative correlation between the 







companies listed on 
the Australian Stock 
Exchange)
mcmlxxA positive correlation between 
the frequency of remuneration 
committee meetings and the 
company’s performance.
mcmlxxiAlthough not in direct 
support of hypothesis 
5, fi rm performance 
is a control variable 
in this study which 
could affect the level 
of executive directors’ 
remuneration.
1Source: Compiled by authors
1In summary, the prior research listed in Table 5 provides evidence that executive 
directors’ remuneration will be lower as the frequency of remuneration committee 
meetings increases.
2It is therefore expected that:
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1H5:  Remuneration of executive directors will be lower for companies where more 
remuneration committee meetings are held.
Methodology
Sample and data
1The sample selected was the Top 100 companies (based on market capitalisation 
as at 31 September 2012) listed on the JSE for the 2009 to 2012 reporting periods. 
These periods were included, because they are considered to cover a transition 
period for the implementation of the recommendations made by the King III 
report. The Top 100 are the largest companies and have the most significant trading 
activity on the JSE. These firms are also most likely to be concerned about their 
public image, including their corporate governance stance, and are most likely to 
have implemented remuneration reforms. The sample included only South African 
companies that had been listed for at least three years and had information available 
on the INET McGregor BFA database for the prescribed sample period. Table 6 
summarises the sample selection process.
Data collection
1Information regarding directors, remuneration paid, institutional and directors’ 
shareholding, the remuneration committee and vote on remuneration policy was 
collected manually from the annual reports of companies for the years 2009 to 2012 
as listed on the library function of the INET McGregor BFA database. Information 
regarding headline earnings per share, income, leverage and return on equity was 
collected from the financial ratio function on the INET McGregor BFA database. A 
summary of the sample selection process is provided in Table 6.
Table 6: Summary of sample selection process
mcmlxxiiTop 100 companies listed on the JSE on 31 September 2012
mcmlxxiiiLess: Companies primarily listed on other exchanges (non-South African companies)
mcmlxxiv Companies listed for less than three years (listing date after 1 January  2009) 








1The prediction found in the hypothesis is that executive directors’ remuneration is 
influenced by various governance and firm characteristics. More specifically, lower 
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levels of remuneration are expected for companies with a higher level of institutional 
ownership, a higher percentage of non-executive directors on the remuneration 
committee, where shareholders vote on the remuneration policy of directors and 
where there is a greater frequency of remuneration committee meetings. On the 
other hand, higher levels of executive remuneration are expected for companies 
whose directors have higher levels of directors’ shareholding.
2An ordinary least squares (OLS) model was used to test the relationship between 
DREM (dependent variable) and the explanatory variables. The model is estimated 
as follows:
DREM = β0 + β1SHAREI jt + β2SHARED jt + β3NEXR jt + β4VRPO jt 
+ β5NRCM jt+ β6SIZE jt + β7HEPS jt + β8DEBT jt + β9PROFIT jt 
+ β10GROWTH jt + β11GROWTHS jt +β
1Where:
2DREM =   Log of average executive directors’ remuneration (Cheng & Firth 
2005; Wong 2009). Executive directors’ remuneration is comprised 
of the following: Gross remuneration of the executive directors 
(DREMG), bonuses awarded to directors (DREMB) and share 
options granted to executive directors (DREMS).
3SHAREI =  The number of shares owned by institutional shareholders divided 
by the total number of ordinary shares at year end.
4SHARED =   The number of shares owned by directors of the company divided 
by the total number of ordinary shares at year end.
5NEXR =  Non-executive directors on the remuneration committee, 
measured as the number of non-executive directors on the board 
divided by the size of the board.
6VRPO =  Vote on remuneration policy by shareholders. This is a dummy 
variable coded 1 if the shareholders vote on the remuneration 
policy in the shareholders meeting, and coded 0 if otherwise.
7NRCM = Number of remuneration committee meetings held during a year.
8SIZE =   The size of the company, measured as the natural log of sales for 
the year.
9HEPS =  The headline earnings per share measured as earnings 
attributable to the operational and capital investment activities of 
the company.
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10DEBT =   The leverage of the company, measured by the ratio of total debt 
to total assets at year end.
11PROFIT =   The profitability of the company, measured by the return on 
equity for the year.
12GROWTH =  The growth of the company, measured by the market-to-book 
value of equity at year end.
13GROWTHS = The yearly proportional change in sales.
14j and t =  Company and time subscripts respectively.
15ε =  The regression residual.
Dependent variable
1The dependent variable used in this article is the average remuneration of executive 
directors. To mitigate the impact of outliers, the log of average executive remuneration 
was used (Doucouliagos, Haman & Askary 2007; Wong 2009).
2Executive directors’ remuneration was further divided into three different 
components: salary and benefits (DREMG), annual performance bonus awards 
(DREMB) and share options granted (DREMS). Annual performance bonus 
is considered to be a short-term variable which is linked to accounting profits, 
generally over a one year period, while share options are considered to be a long-term 
component. Separate models were run to include salary and benefits, bonus, share 
options and total as dependent variables.
Independent variables
1The ownership and governance variables used by Hartzell and Starks (2003), Cheng 
and Firth (2005), Khan et al. (2005), Ozkan (2007) and Ozkan (2011) were the 
number of shares owned by institutional shareholders divided by the total number 
of ordinary shares at year end (SHAREI).
2Khan et al. (2005), Cheng and Firth (2005), Farber (2005), Basu et al. (2007) and 
Ozkan (2011) used the number of shares owned by directors of the company divided 
by the total number of ordinary shares at year end (SHARED).
3Pukthuanthong et al. (2004), Cheng and Firth (2005), Basu et al. (2007), Wong 
(2009) and Cybinski and Windsor (2013) also used non-executive directors on the 
remuneration committee, measured as the number of non-executive directors on the 
board divided by the size of the board as a control variable (NEXR).
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4King III introduced another corporate governance measure whereby it is stipulated 
that shareholders should vote on the remuneration policy of remuneration paid to 
directors of the company, thus dummy variables were awarded to these factors coded 
1 if the shareholders voted on the remuneration policy and coded 0 if no vote was 
cast (VPRO). This was used by Al-Issa (2009), Conyon and Sadler (2010), and Ferri 
and Maber (2013).
5The remuneration committee should have sufficient scheduled meetings to 
discharge all its duties with a minimum of two meetings per year (NRCM). This 
was tested by listing the number of meetings held, as supported by Hahn and Lasfer 
(2007), and Hoque et al. (2013).
Control variables
1The following control variables which could have an effect at the level of executive 
remuneration were used:
• Company size (SIZE) (measured by log of sales) (also used by Cheng and Firth 
(2005), Wong (2009), and Gregory-Smith (2012))
• Profitability (PROFIT) (measured by return on equity) (also used by Cheng and 
Firth (2005), Wong (2009) and Hoque et al. (2013))
• Headline earnings per share (HEPS) (as used by Main, Jackson, Pymm and Wright 
(2008))
• Growth (GROWTH) (measured by market-to-book value of equity) (as used by 
Balachandran, Ferri and Maber (2007), Ferri and Maber (2013); Conyon and 
Sadler (2010) and Abeysekera (2012))
• Growth of sales (GROWTHS) (measured by yearly proportional change in sale) (as 
used by Cheng and Firth (2005), and Wong (2009))
• Leverage (DEBT) (used as a control measure due to the monitoring effect of 
debtholders) (as used by Cheng and Firth (2005), and Hoque et al. (2013))
Empirical results
Descriptive statistics
1Descriptive statistics regarding the companies’ dependent, independent and 
control variables were considered before calculating the regressions. The data 
were transformed to limit the skewness. The independent variables were therefore 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. Square root transformations were 
performed for the headline earnings per share, profitability and debt variables. The 
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variable for growth has a severe negative-skew distribution and was transformed 
by ranking the observations. Stationarity is not a concern in the data as ratios were 
used. Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics for the raw data (Panel A) and the 
transformed variables (Panel B) for the years 2009 to 2012.
Table 7: Descriptive statistics (284 observations)
mcmlxxxiiPanel A: Descriptive statistics for raw data years 2009 to 2012
mcmlxxxiiiVariables mcmlxxxivMean mcmlxxxvMinimum mcmlxxxviMaximum mcmlxxxviiMedian
mcmlxxxviiiStd. 
Deviation
mcmlxxxixDREMG (R’000) mcmxc4 854 mcmxci578 mcmxcii72 133 mcmxciii3 802 mcmxciv5 134
mcmxcvDREMB (R’000) mcmxcvi2 852 mcmxcvii0 mcmxcviii27 372 mcmxcix1 559 mm3 801
mmiDREMS (R’000) mmii2 371 mmiii0 mmiv70 507 mmv941 mmvi5 199
mmviiSHAREI mmviii0.262 mmix0 mmx0.9 mmxi0.22 mmxii0.209
mmxiiiSHARED mmxiv0.053 mmxv0 mmxvi0.4 mmxvii0.01 mmxviii0.090
mmxixNEXR mmxx0.743 mmxxi0 mmxxii1.0 mmxxiii0.75 mmxxiv0.231
mmxxvVPRO mmxxvi0.500 mmxxvii0 mmxxviii1.0 mmxxix0.5 mmxxx0.500
mmxxxiNRCM mmxxxii3.962 mmxxxiii2 mmxxxiv10 mmxxxv4 mmxxxvi1.263
mmxxxviiSIZE (R’000) mmxxxviii44 612 mmxxxix740 mmxl1 191 345 mmxli17 158 mmxlii11 147
mmxliiiHEPS mmxliv695 mmxlv-1880 mmxlvi13772 mmxlvii371.8 mmxlviii1 207
mmxlixDEBT mml2.674 mmli0 mmlii58.08 mmliii0.99 mmliv5.657














mmlxxivPanel B: Descriptive statistics for transformed variables 
mmlxxvVariables mmlxxviMean mmlxxviiMinimum mmlxxviiiMaximum mmlxxixMedian
mmlxxxStd. 
Deviation
mmlxxxiHEPS(sqrt) mmlxxxii23.215 mmlxxxiii4.00 mmlxxxiv74 mmlxxxv20.17 mmlxxxvi12.799
mmlxxxviiPROFIT (sqrt) mmlxxxviii3.654 mmlxxxix0.9 mmxc8.9 mmxci3.5 mmxcii1.441
mmxciiiDEBT (sqrt) mmxciv0.371 mmxcv0.1 mmxcvi1.2 mmxcvii0.99 mmxcviii0.2158
1The amount of directors’ remuneration granted was varied. The mean for gross 
remuneration awarded to executive directors was R4 854 000 and the minimum was 
R578 000 with a maximum of R72 133 000.
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2The mean for bonuses awarded to executive directors was R2 852 000, and the 
maximum was R27 372 000. The maximum value of share options awarded to 
executive directors was R70 507 000 and the mean was R2 371 000. The minimum 
for bonuses and share options granted was R0, indicating that some companies did 
not award share options to executive directors for the periods under review.
3On average, institutional shareholders owned 26% of the shares, and directors 
owned 5% of the issued shares of the relevant companies. The average percentage 
of non-executive directors on the remuneration committee was 74%. Approximately 
50% of the firms voted on the remuneration policy, as required by the King III report. 
This can be attributed to the fact that King III was only applicable for reporting years 
2011 and 2012. An average of four remuneration committee meetings was held per 
year. The average income earned by the companies tested was R44 612 000. Headline 
earnings per share shows an average of 695 cents per share. The average leverage of 
the Top 100 companies tested was 2.674 of their assets. The average return on equity 
of 15% represents attractive levels of investment quality, which can be expected by 
the Top 100 companies on the JSE. The market-to-book value was 3.5 on average, 
indicating greater expected future gains because of perceived growth opportunities 
and competitive advantages of the Top 100 companies. The growth in sales had a 
mean of 87%, indicating a large percentage of sales growth over the period tested.
Correlations
1Correlations are regarded to be amongst the most general and functional statistics. 
They indicate whether variables are positively or negatively related, as well as the 
relative strength of the relationship. The Pearson correlation was used to establish 
relationships between the data elements.
2The assumptions underlying the regression model were tested for multi-
collinearity by calculating a correlation matrix and a variance inflation factor (VIF) 
for each variable. All of the VIFs tested were below two. The tolerance factors are all 
well above 0.1 and 10 for VIFs, suggesting that multi-collinearity is not a problem 
when interpreting the regression results. Since no differences were found between 
the direction and significance levels of the correlations in respect of the profit, 
debt and growth variables for the raw data and transformed data, only the Pearson 
correlation coefficients for all the variables, using raw data, are provided in Table 
8. Significance levels of 1% and 5% were considered to determine the relationship 
between dependent and independent variables. The data satisfied the assumptions of 
normality of residuals and homoscedasticity.
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Dependent variables
1A statistically significant positive correlation exists between DREMG and DREMS.
VPRO has a significantly positive correlation with DREMG, DREMB (at the 5% 
level) and DREMS (at the 1% level). There is also a significantly positive rela-
tionship between DREMG, DREMB, DREMS and the SIZE of the companies 
tested.
1In addition, the analysis shows that there is a significantly positive relationship 
between DREMB, DREMS (at the 1% level) and HEPS. The analysis also shows 
that DREMS is significantly inversely associated at a 5% level with SHAREI. 
There is also a significant positive correlation between DREMS and DEBT and 
GROWTH at the 5% level.
Independent variables
1SHAREI has a significant inverse correlation with SHARED. SHAREI also has a 
significant positive correlation with NEXR and SIZE. There is a significant inverse 
relationship at the 5% level between SHAREI and PROFIT. SHARED has a 
significant inverse correlation with NEXR, SIZE and DEBT. A significant positive 
relationship exists between SHARED and GROWTHS at the 1% level.
2NEXR have a significant inverse correlation with NRCM at the 1% level. A 
significantly positive relationship exists between NEXR and SIZE. VPRO has a 
significant relationship to the SIZE (1% level), DEBT and GROWTH (5% level). 
The number of remuneration committee meetings (NRCM) is significantly related 
to SIZE, HEPS, DEBT and GROWTH.
Control variables
1SIZE is significantly positively related to HEPS (1% level). HEPS is positively 
related to the PROFIT of the company. A significantly inverse relationship exists 
between DEBT, PROFIT and GROWTH. A significant positive relationship exists 
between PROFIT and GROWTH (1% level).
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Regression analysis
Background
1A regression analysis (as shown in Table 9) was conducted to determine whether the 
variation in DREM (and its different elements) can be explained by the independent 
and control variables. The main interest in Table 9 is the sign and the significance 
of the independent and control variables tested. The independent variables have a 
20.9% explanatory power (adjusted R²= 0.209, f= 7.047) of DREM. Looking at the 
different types of remuneration, the independent variables have a 25% explanatory 
power (adjusted R²=.250 f=1.4) for DREMG and an 11.7% (adjusted R²= 0.117, 
f= 3.319) for DREMB and 13% for DREMS (adjusted R²= 0.130, f= 3.377).
Regression analysis in relation to the hypothesis stated
Institutional ownership
1SHAREI has a significant relationship with DREM on the 1% level. SHAREI has 
an inverse significant relationship with DREMS (on the 5% level). Hypothesis 1 is 
therefore only supported for DREMS, but not for DREM, DREMG or DREMB. 
This is consistent with Hartzell and Starks (2003), Cheng and Firth (2005), Khan et 
al. (2005) and Ozkan’s (2011) findings. Institutional ownership is effective because 
of their monitoring ability. Share-options are considered to be an effective way to 
address the agency theory (Shleifer &Vishney 1997).
Directors’ shareholding
1SHARED supports higher executive remuneration for DREM at the 1% level. 
Hypothesis 2 is therefore supported for DREM, but not for DREMG, DREMB 
& DREMS. This is consistent with the findings of Khan et al. (2005), Basu et al. 
(2007), and Ozkan (2011).
Non-executive directors on the remuneration committee
1NCRM has a significant inverse relationship with DREM (on the 1% level). No 
significant relationship exists between the individual elements (DREMG, DREMB, 
& DREMS) and NCRM. This is consistent with Hypothesis 3 and the findings of 
Cheng and Firth (2005), Basu et al. (2007), and Cybinski and Windsor (2013).
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1VPRO is significantly inversely related with DREMG (on the 5% level), DREMB, 
DREMS and DREM (all on 1% level). Hypothesis 4 is therefore supported for all 
the elements of executive directors’ remuneration and is consistent with the findings 
of Al-Issa (2009).
The number of remuneration committee meetings held
1NRCM is significantly inversely related for DREM, but not for the individual 
elements (DREMG, DREMB 7 DREMS). Hypothesis 5 is therefore supported for 
DREM. This is consistent with Hahn and Lasfer’s (2007) findings.
Explanation of directors’ remuneration by independent and control variables
Total directors’ remuneration
1Total directors’ remuneration is statistically significantly explained by the number of 
shares owned by institutional shareholders (SHAREI), the number of shares owned 
by directors (SHARED), the number of non-executive directors on the remuneration 
committee (NEXR), the size of the company (SIZE) and the headline earnings per 
share (HEPS).
Gross directors’ remuneration
1Gross directors’ remuneration is statistically significantly explained at the 5% level 
by the vote on the remuneration policy by shareholders (VRPO). At the 1% level the 
size of the company (SIZE) and headline earnings per share (HEPS) significantly 
explain the variance in gross executive remuneration.
Bonuses
1Bonuses is statistically significantly explained at the 5% level by the voting on the 
remuneration policy by shareholders (VRPO), the size of the company (SIZE), the 
leverage of the company (DEBT) and the headline earnings per share (HEPS) at 
the 1% level.
Share options granted
1Share options granted is statistically significantly explained at the 5% level by 
the voting by shareholders on the remuneration policy (VPRO), the size of the 
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company (SIZE), the headline earnings per share (HEPS) and at the 5% level by 
the institutional shareholding (SHAREI), the leverage of the company (DEBT) 
and the growth of the company (GROWTH).



























mmcclivSHAREI mmcclv- mmcclvi.005 mmcclvii.007** mmcclviii.240 mmcclix.101 mmcclx.443 mmcclxi.057 mmcclxii-1.258
mmcclxiii.042*
mmcclxivSHARED mmcclxv+ mmcclxvi.578 mmcclxvii.000** mmcclxviii1.879 mmcclxix.803 mmcclxx1.436 mmcclxxi.948 mmcclxxii1.318
mmcclxxiii.810
mmcclxxivNEXR mmcclxxv- mmcclxxvi-.059 mmcclxxvii.001** mmcclxxviii.124 mmcclxxix.227 mmcclxxx.228 mmcclxxxi.321 mmcclxxxii.670
mmcclxxxiii.355
mmcclxxxivVPRO mmcclxxxv- mmcclxxxvi-.210 mmcclxxxvii.000** mmcclxxxviii-.520 mmcclxxxix.014* mmccxc-.358 mmccxci.003** mmccxcii-.335
mmccxciii.003**
mmccxcivNRCM mmccxcv- mmccxcvi-.087 mmccxcvii.004** mmccxcviii.078 mmccxcix.089 mmccc.097 mmccci.296 mmcccii.072
mmccciii.422
mmcccivSIZE mmcccv+ mmcccvi.144 mmcccvii.000** mmcccviii.271 mmcccix.000** mmcccx.209 mmcccxi.000** mmcccxii.145
mmcccxiii.006**
mmcccxivHEPS¹ (sqrt) mmcccxv+ mmcccxvi.015 mmcccxvii.000** mmcccxviii-.001 mmcccxix.004** mmcccxx.000 mmcccxxi.032* mmcccxxii.035
mmcccxxiii.000**
mmcccxxivDEBT¹(sqrt) mmcccxxv- mmcccxxvi.034 mmcccxxvii.090 mmcccxxviii.065 mmcccxxix.616 mmcccxxx.043 mmcccxxxi.006** mmcccxxxii.064
mmcccxxxiii.029*
mmcccxxxivPROFIT¹(sqrt) mmcccxxxv+ mmcccxxxvi-.037 mmcccxxxvii.458 mmcccxxxviii.078 mmcccxxxix.138 mmcccxl-.006 mmcccxli.060 mmcccxlii-.073
mmcccxliii.369
mmcccxlivGROWTH mmcccxlv+ mmcccxlvi.006 mmcccxlvii.386 mmcccxlviii-0.15 mmcccxlix.889 mmcccl-.035 mmcccli.726 mmccclii.023
mmcccliii.011*
mmccclivGROWTHS mmccclv+ mmccclvi.076 mmccclvii.735 mmccclviii-100 mmccclix.682 mmccclx.448 mmccclxi.279 mmccclxii-.004
mmccclxiii.466
mmccclxivR-SQUARED mmccclxv.241 mmccclxvi.276 mmccclxvii.158 mmccclxviii.178
mmccclxixADJUSTED 
R-SQUARED
mmccclxx.209 mmccclxxi.250 mmccclxxii.117 mmccclxxiii.130
mmccclxxivN mmccclxxv287 mmccclxxvi284 mmccclxxvii245 mmccclxxviii205
mmccclxxixF mmccclxxx7.047 mmccclxxxi1.400 mmccclxxxii3.319 mmccclxxxiii3.377
mmccclxxxivNotes
mmccclxxxv** Signifi cant at the 0.01 level
mmccclxxxvi * Signifi cant at the 0.05 level
mmccclxxxviiThe dependent variables are the average basic salary and benefi ts, bonuses, shares and total salaries.
mmccclxxxviiiThe independent variables consist of the following:
mmccclxxxix(1)  Shareholdings: The percentage shares owned by institutional shareholders (SHAREI), the percentage shares owned by 
directors of the company (SHARED)
mmcccxc(2)  Remuneration committee characteristics: NEXR: (percentage of non-executive directors on the remuneration 
committee), VPRO: (vote on remuneration policy), GROWTH ( market-to-book ratio), PROFIT (return on capital 
employed), DEBT (debt-to-assets ratio)
mmcccxci(3)  Control variables: SIZE: (natural log of sales), HEPS: (the headline earnings per share), DEBT (debt-to-assets ratio), 
PROFIT (return on equity for the year), GROWTH ( market-to-book ratio), GROWTHS (the yearly proportional 
change in sales)
mmcccxcii
1 Transformed variables (sqrt = square root). 
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Additional analysis
1To test the robustness of the results additional analysis was performed. The regression 
was re-tested by excluding the control variables of sales, headline earnings per share, 
leverage, return on equity, market-to-book value and change in sales. The results 
obtained were consistent with the original regression performed. In view of the fact 
that no differences were found between the original regression model and the one 
excluding the control variables, only the original regression analysis is included in 
Table 9.
Summary and conclusion
1Excessive executive directors’ remuneration remains a major concern for many 
stakeholders and it is one of the factors to blame for the global financial crisis (Crotty 
2009; INTOSAI 2010). In response to these concerns various corporate governance 
reforms have been advocated.
2In this study, by testing a sample from the Top 100 companies listed on the JSE 
for the period 2009 to 2012, the effect of the implementation of certain corporate 
governance reforms on executive directors’ remuneration was tested. King III reports 
that the ‘apply or explain approach’ is stronger if the implementation is overseen 
by institutional investors. The findings in relation to hypothesis 1 indicate that 
institutional shareholding only has a monitoring effect on share options granted 
but not on bonuses and gross remuneration. On the other hand, in accordance with 
hypothesis 2, the results show that higher directors’ shareholding has a positive impact 
on total executive directors’ remuneration. King III indicated that the remuneration 
committee should comprise a majority of non-executive directors. The results for 
hypothesis 3 indicate that non-executive directors on the remuneration committee 
do reduce the total executive directors’ remuneration. King III requires an advisory 
vote on remuneration policy, and the results of hypothesis 4 indicate that the vote on 
the remuneration policy does influence all the elements and total executive directors’ 
remuneration. Hypothesis 5 indicates that the number of remuneration committee 
meetings held has an effect on the total executive directors’ remuneration. King III 
further requires that annual bonuses granted should be linked to performance. The 
control variables tested found that bonuses granted are positively related to headline 
earnings per share, but not to the other performance indicators, such as return on 
equity or market-to-book value. It further indicates that total directors’ remuneration 
can be statistically explained by institutional shareholding, directors’ shareholding, 
non-executive directors’ on the remuneration committee, size of the company and 
headline earnings per share.
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3It is suggested that future research could focus on linking the firm characteristics 
to the remuneration policy of the company, linking company performance to executive 
remuneration, and investigating the ideal structure of executive remuneration. The 
data could also be expanded to include more years since the King III implementation 
in order to test whether King III has had an effect on directors’ remuneration.
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